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MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADEMARK
David W. Barnes'
The dominant view of misappropriation doctrine fits trademark
law poorly. It is at odds with contemporary theory and the reasons
for protecting intellectual property. A more nuanced view of the
Supreme Court's germinal misappropriation case leads to a
misappropriation doctrine consistent with both externality theory
and public goods theory. When viewed this way, IP theory and
misappropriation doctrine then lead to rules reflecting a balance
between incentive creation and free access. Applying this nuanced
interpretation to the issue of Internet initial interest confusion
suggests that keyword advertising promotes competition and
reduces search costs more than it interferes with incentives to
engage in trademarking activity.
INTRODUCTION
The state law doctrine of misappropriation is based on the idea
that people should not reap where they have not sown, that they
should not free-ride on the investments of others.2 Trademark
owners sow investments in their trademarks to reap the resulting
goodwill: increased sales brought about by increased renown. If it
is a "misnomer to talk of 'misappropriation' of trademarks,"' as the
1 Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of
Law.
2 A simple view of the elements of such a claim is that the plaintiff has
incurred expenses to create something of value, the defendant has profited from
that creation without similar expenses, and the plaintiff is damaged. See infra
text accompanying note 11.
3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 10.72 (4th ed. 2006). One of the leading authorities on
trademark law, J. Thomas McCarthy, observed that:
The misappropriation doctrine cannot be used in ordinary trademark
infringement cases as a shortcut around the trademark law's standards
of protection. That is, one cannot dispense with the care fully [sic]
constructed requirements for trademark protection by blithely claiming
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leading trademark authority suggests, reaping another's goodwill
should not be enough to support a trademark infringement claim.
Courts do, however, rely on this simple interpretation of the
misappropriation doctrine in trademark cases. Reaping another's
goodwill is sufficient justification in some jurisdictions for finding
infringement in Internet initial interest confusion cases.'
This Article argues that the "free-riding" view of
misappropriation oversimplifies the Supreme Court's germinal
misappropriation case, International News Service v. Associated
Press.' This simple view is consistent with enjoining Internet
keyword advertising, an outcome supported by a recent paper in
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology.' A more
that defendant "misappropriated" some symbol of plaintiff which may
or may not be capable of trademark protection.
Id. Because it is inappropriate to speak of trademark infringement without
demonstrating the usual requirements of consumer confusion about what
supplier is the source of a product, "it is a misnomer to talk of
'misappropriation' of trademarks or trade symbols of any type." Id.
4 See Benjamin Aitken, Keyword-Linked Advertising, Trademark Infringement,
and Google's Contributory Liability, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 21, 24
(discussing the contributory liability of search engine providers who aid Internet
advertisers). Aitken concludes that search engine providers will be
contributorily liable if "the ads . . . conceal the advertiser's identity such that the
consumer is confused as to the source of the ad, even if just initially." Id. For
there to be contributory infringement, there must be direct infringement by the
advertiser. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 949, 960-61 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Liability for contributory infringement
requires that the defendant either '(1) intentionally induces another to infringe
on a trademark or (2) continues to supply a product knowing that the recipient is
using the product to engage in trademark infringement.'" (citing Fonovisa Inc.
v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting the test set
forth in Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982))).
The present article argues that where misappropriation is at issue, there can be
no finding of direct infringement on which to base contributory infringement.
5248 U.S. 215 (1918).
6 See Benjamin F. Sidbury, Comparative Advertising on the Internet: Defining
the Boundaries of Trademark Fair Use for Internet Metatags and Trigger Ads, 3
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 35, 60 (2001) ("If the plaintiff can show that the defendant is
either (1) using the plaintiff's mark with the intent to usurp the plaintiff's good
will (and lure web surfers to defendant's website rather than plaintiffs site) or
(2) is acting in bad faith by creating deception as to source or sponsorship, the
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nuanced reading of the Supreme Court's opinion reveals a
misappropriation doctrine that is consistent with the leading
underlying theories of intellectual property and inconsistent with
finding infringement based on initial interest confusion.
This Article compares the overly simple view of
misappropriation theory that supports finding infringement in
initial interest confusion cases to a more nuanced and accurate
view. Internet initial interest confusion cases sometimes involve
one supplier including another supplier's trademark in its website's
domain name, part of a website's uniform resource locator
("URL")7 or hypertext markup language ("HTML"),' or other
buried code that is visible to search engines but not to computer
users. Using another's trademark in this way may confuse a
computer user, at least initially, by creating the false impression
that the search results are associated with the trademark owner. In
other cases, when a computer user enters a trademark as a search
term, the search engine uses the mark as a keyword to prompt the
display of an advertisement or a link to the website of an entity
other than the mark owner.9 Because these practices threaten to
divert trade from the trademark owner to others, trademark owners
often sue the other supplier and/or the search engine provider,
alleging trademark infringement. Contrary to basic intellectual
property theory, reviewed herein, and the nuanced
misappropriation theory, some courts grant relief."o These courts
rely more on the view that one ought not to reap where one has not
court should enjoin the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark in the defendant's
metatags." (emphasis added)).
7 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (West Coast preliminarily enjoined from using
Brookfield's "moviebuff' trademark as its domain name).
8 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th
Cir. 2000) (Natural Answers, Inc. preliminarily enjoined from using Eli Lilly's
trademark "Prozac" in its HTML code).
9 See, e.g., Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, L.L.C., 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 123-
24 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Better Metal paid Yahoo! Inc. to display a sponsored link
to the Better Metal website when computer users entered the Site Pro-i mark as
a search term. The district court held that such a use does not qualify as the type
of use the trademark statute prohibits. Id. at 127-28.
'0 See infra Part C.
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sown than on proof of consumer confusion about the source of
products.
A. MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The simple view of misappropriation theory rests on the
premise that persons should not be able to appropriate the benefits
of another's investment without a similar investment of their own.
Three basic elements reflect this simple view:
(1) Plaintiff has made a substantial investment of time, effort and
money into creating the thing misappropriated such that the court
can characterize that "thing" as a kind of property right [the
creation element].
(2) Defendant had appropriated the "thing" at little or no cost, such
that the court can characterize defendant's action as "reaping
where it has not sown" [the appropriation element].
(3) Defendant has injured plaintiff by the misappropriation [the injury
element].''
Courts routinely cite the Supreme Court's opinion in International
News Service v. Associated Press as the basis for what is now,
post-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,12 the state common law
doctrine of misappropriation.'
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 10.51. Some jurisdictions require that the
defendant's benefit result from gaining a competitive advantage over the creator.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted Texas law as
requiring a modified appropriation element, stating that there must be use of the
product created by the plaintiff "in competition with plaintiff, thereby giving the
defendant a special competitive advantage because he was burdened with little
or none of the expense incurred by plaintiff in the creation of the product."
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 788 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993)). The court stated that, unlike other intellectual property
laws, "misappropriation law is specifically designed to protect the labor-the
so-called 'sweat equity'-that goes into creating a work." Id. (emphasis in
original).
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts to give deference to state
courts when interpreting state common law and abandoning the practice of
federal courts determining what state common law should be).
13 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel,
166 F.3d at 788; Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d
Cir. 1997); Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 802
(6th Cir. 1996); Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7
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Revisiting the Supreme Court's opinion, however, reveals a
more complex misappropriation doctrine. The International News
Service v. Associated Press opinion permitted many people, even
competitors, to free-ride on the Associated Press' investment in
gathering news. The Associated Press ("AP"), a news gathering
organization, distributed news it had collected at great expense to
its paying members, primarily newspaper publishers. International
News Service ("INS"), through various devices, 4 took news
gathered by AP and distributed it to its own paying members,
thereby enabling them to publish the news simultaneously with
AP's members." By taking this news while it was still hot, INS
was free-riding on AP's efforts, "endeavoring to reap where it
ha[d] not sown."6 The ensuing injunction did not prevent all free-
riding. It prevented only free-riding that "interfere[d] with the
normal operation of complainant's legitimate business precisely at
the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a
material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to
those who have not." 7
The Supreme Court specifically recognized that many people,
including competitors, could and should be allowed to free-ride on
AP's efforts. For instance, the purchaser of a newspaper may
spread his or her knowledge of the news gratuitously." This is an
important and allowable free-riding function because society
presumably benefits from an informed citizenry. Moreover,
competing news organizations may obtain leads from the news
gathered by AP and, upon verification, publish their own articles. 9
Additionally, no one would suppose that AP had the right for all
time to report a historic event.20
F.3d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1993); Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv.,
Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th
Cir. 1985).
14 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 229-30 (1918).
" Id. at 239.
1 id.
'7 Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 239.
'9 Id. at 242-45.20 Id. at 234.
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The Court determined that AP's right extended only so far as to
encourage its newsgathering activity by preventing INS from
interfering exactly where a profit was to be made. Accepting
INS's argument that the news was abandoned to the public would
"render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in effect to
cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison
with the return."2' The Court balanced the need of the public and
competitors to have access to the news with the need for incentives
for media companies to invest in newsgathering activities2 2 and
thus preserved only AP's lead time advantage.
There are two views of misappropriation. The simple view
prohibits one actor from free-riding on the activity of the other.
The nuanced view prohibits one actor from free-riding on the
activity of the other if doing so would interfere with the incentive
to engage in that particular creative activity to the detriment of
society at large. Many courts' rulings in Internet initial interest
confusion cases reflect the simple view." Intellectual property
theory and trademark law generally reflect the more nuanced
view.2
B. TRADEMARK AND NUANCED MISAPPROPRIATION
Trademark cases generally, and initial interest confusion cases
in particular, present a conflict between the need to create
incentive for innovation, on one hand, and provide free public
access, on the other. The creative activity is trademarking activity,
whereby symbols are endowed with information-carrying capacity.
A trademark may indicate that the product to which it is affixed
21 Id. at 241.
22 A few misappropriation cases recognize this balancing of incentives and
access. See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d
1028, 1035 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he dilemma posed by the [misappropriation]
doctrine can best be viewed as an attempt to provide the necessary incentives to
the creators of intellectual property without unnecessarily restricting the public's
free access to information."). To resolve this dilemma, the court in U.S. Golf
required that the defendant in a misappropriation case be a competitor of the
plaintiff. Id. at 1038.
23 See infra Part C.24 See infra Part B.
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comes from a particular source or has certain quality or price
characteristics. The Starbucks mark indicates not only that the
coffee comes from Starbucks Corporation, but that the coffee is
priced higher and brewed stronger than other major brands. At
considerable cost, Starbucks provides this information to the public
and then protects its investment by ensuring that other coffee shops
do not confuse customers by using similar marks. Its trademarking
activities include, among other things, signage and labeling,
advertising, and discouraging infringers. Through these activities,
Starbucks provides considerable benefit to consumers who can be
certain that coffee sold with the Starbucks mark affixed will have
those characteristics. If Starbucks could not provide that certainty
by the exclusive use of the mark as a source indicator, its incentive
to invest in trademarking activity would diminish."5
Trademark laws reflect society's interest in permitting some
others to use an owner's trademark freely. Consumers, for
instance, must have access to these marks in order to locate
products they desire and reject products they do not like.
Consumers use the mark to refer to the products they seek. The
Lanham Act also permits suppliers of goods and services to make
fair use of another's mark to describe their own goods.2 6 Courts
agree that it is good public policy to permit competitors to engage
25 See, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir.
1995) (concluding that, by ignoring the benefits of comparative advertising, the
district court had given insufficient consideration to the public interest in
promoting competition). Both the FTC and the FDA encourage product
comparisons. The FTC believes that consumers gain from comparative
advertising, and to make the comparison vivid the Commission "encourages the
naming of, or reference to competitors." 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) (2008). A
"comparison" to a mystery rival is just puffery; it is not falsifiable and therefore
is not informative. Because comparisons must be concrete to be useful, the
FDA's regulations implementing the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), prefer that the object of a nutritional comparison
be the market leader (a "comparison" to a product consumers do not recognize is
as useless as a comparison to an anonymous rival) or a representative of a
nutritional average of the three leading brands. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(j)(1)(ii)(A)
(2007).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § Ill5(b)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2007). For example, the fact
that "Apple" is a trademark of Apple Computers, Inc. does not prevent fruit
suppliers from accurately describing their produce as being apples.
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in comparative advertising that identifies competing products by
their marks27 and to use the original manufacturer's marks on
reconditioned or repackaged goods.2 8 The First Amendment
protects artists and social commentators who use others'
trademarks while expressing their views.29 These are all referential
uses-uses by consumers, competitors, and artists to refer to the
mark owners' goods-rather than proprietary uses-uses by
sellers to indicate that the owner of the mark is supplying the
goods.30
When challenged, these referential uses invoke a balancing
test. The potential for consumer confusion and accompanying
diminution in incentive to engage in trademarking activity arises in
situations where it is unclear whether the use is referential or
proprietary. When a seller of tattooing inks describes its selection
of inks containing very fine pigments as "micro-colors," does the
potential confusion arising from the use of a competitor's
Microcolors mark outweigh the benefits from increased
competition through the provision of an accurate product
description?' When a package of Life Savers butter candies says
27 See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431-34
(2003).
28 For an example, see Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125,
130 (1947), where Sanders reconditioned and sold used Champion Spark Plugs
and labeled them using Champion's trademark:
The result is, of course, that the second-hand dealer gets some
advantage from the trade mark. But under the rule of Prestonettes,
Inc., v. Coty, [in which the defendant repackaged Coty perfume in
smaller bottles], that is wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer
is not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from
wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer. Full disclosure gives
the manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.
29 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1994) ("We
believe that in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs
the public interest in free expression.").
30 See David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 22, 28-30 (2006) (distinguishing between referential and
proprietary uses of trademarks).
31 See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 122 (2004) (opening the door to the weighing of competing considerations
including likelihood of confusion and commercial justification); see also David
[VOL. 9: 171178
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that the candies are "25% LOWER IN CALORIES THAN
WERTHER'S@ ORIGINAL* CANDY"'3 2 does this use, on balance,
confuse consumers about the source or promote competition?
When a seller of reconditioned Titleist golf balls truthfully
describes the balls as having been repaired, does the competitive
benefit of lower prices for balls of different quality outweigh the
diminished returns from investment in the Titleist mark?" When
an artist uses a Barbie doll in his creative work, does the artistic
relevance of the doll outweigh the potential confusion about
whether Mattel sponsored the art?34 Each of these uses takes
advantage of the mark owner's name recognition, but the balancing
reflects concern for more than the owner's investment. In the
descriptive fair use, comparative fair use, and artistic fair use cases
described in this paragraph, the user of another's mark may have
been reaping where he has not sown, but the resulting
''appropriation" is not necessarily "misappropriation."
C. INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION:
SIMPLE AND NUANCED MISAPPROPRIATION
The most straightforward Internet initial interest confusion
cases arise when a competitor uses another's mark as a keyword to
produce pop-up advertising or a sponsored link. As an example, a
competitor paid Google to display a link to its website whenever a
computer user typed in the GEICO mark of a leading insurance
company as a search term." Any confusion about who sponsored
W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use: Confusion about Defenses, 20
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 838 (2004) (discussing
balancing test in the classic descriptive fair use context).
32 August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 617 (7thCir. 1995).
3 Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding that reconditioner of Titleist golf balls had not infringed on mark
owner's rights because the marketing sufficiently dissociated the reconditioned
balls from the original manufacturer).
34 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that, because the Barbie mark accurately described the subject of the
artistic work and did not explicitly mislead as to Mattel's sponsorship of the
work, the balance favored permitting this referential use).
3 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D.
Va. 2004).
SPRING 2008] 179
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
the ad or link is immediately dispelled when the computer user
clicks on the ad or link. The court held that this use of another's
mark can form the basis for a trademark infringement claim."6
Courts use a variety of policy justifications for finding
infringement in these cases that have nothing to do with
competition or consumer confusion, but instead concern questions
of free-riding. It is a "violation of the Lanham Act," according to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to "use[] the
goodwill associated with Plaintiffs' trademarks in such a way that
consumers might be lured to the [products] from Plaintiffs'
competitors."" The lack of reference to consumer confusion or
competition suggests that it does not matter whether consumers are
more satisfied or competition is enhanced as a result of the
practice. In these cases, it is enough that the competitor uses the
other's investment to get noticed. That is why these trademark
infringement cases look more like misappropriation cases.
The impact of that diversion of trade on competition is unclear.
Customers may be slightly delayed in finding their preferred
website, which would slightly raise consumers' costs of searching
for a specific seller. The consumer will, however, almost certainly
be offered competitive alternatives as a result of this practice, just
as a person seeking Listerine on a drugstore shelf will find the
store brand nearby. The existence of competitive alternatives
lowers prices and creates greater variety, ultimately benefiting
consumers." The store brand free-rides on the drawing power of
the Listerine brand. As long as there is no sustained confusion,39
the competitive effect seems positive. Keyword advertising
36 Id. at 705.
37 Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006).
38 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 112 (1776).
3 If the website to which the computer user is taken confused consumers by
misleading them to think that it is sponsored by the mark owner, that would lead
to traditional point-of-sale confusion and be analyzed as a typical infringement
case. See, e.g., 777388 Ontario Ltd. v. Lencore Acoustics Corp., 105 F. Supp.
2d 56, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (demonstrating a situation where metatags led
computer user to website with product names confusingly similar to plaintiffs
marks).
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provides additional information to targeted consumers and reduces
their cost of finding desirable products.40
Many courts ignore any analysis of competitive effects despite
trademark law's goal of decreasing search costs and increasing
competition.4 ' The courts do not consider the incentive effects of
giving greater trademark protection, but instead tend to focus
solely on the unfairness of the appropriation of the other's efforts.
The problem is that the defendant is "capitalizing on the trademark
holder's goodwill."42 The courts often conclude that the central
issue is whether there was an appropriation of goodwill, regardless
of the duration of the consumer's confusion: "That consumers
who are misled to [the defendant's] website are only briefly
confused is of little or no consequence."43 These courts decline to
examine the scope of rights by balancing incentives and access.
D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY AND MISAPPROPRIATION
Current as well as evolving intellectual property theory
supports a nuanced view of misappropriation requiring a balancing
of incentives and access. Scholars increasingly see copyright and
patent law as a means for deciding which external benefits
resulting from authors' and inventors' creative efforts should be
internalized." The normative lesson from their work is that the
40 Barnes & Laky, supra note 31, stated:
Ultimately, the benefit of protecting mark owners' goodwill is to
consumers, who may rely on the qualities and characteristics of the
supplier's goods conveyed through the mark and appreciate the
advantages of vigorous competition. This lowers prices and increases
available alternatives to satisfy consumers' diverse tastes. This
reliance reduces consumers' cost of seeking information about goods,
including not just reading labels, advertising, and literature, but
acquiring experience by buying and rejecting unsuitable goods.
Id. at 838-39 (internal citations omitted).
41 See Barnes, supra note 30 (discussing the goals of trademark law); Barnes
& Laky, supra note 31 (same).
42 Australian Gold, 436 F.3d at 1239.
43 Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp. 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002).
44 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257, 265 (2007) (applying externalities theory to copyright and patent
law); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law:
Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2005) (applying the theory of
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law ought to (1) protect works only when doing so creates more
social benefits than costs and (2) incur no greater social cost than
necessary to provide incentives to the creator.4 5 This is inherently
a balancing process.
Costs and benefits reflect the dual concerns of incentives and
access. The social costs of enforcing rights to protect incentives
come from higher prices and the exclusion of some consumers
from the market (deadweight loss),46 as well as the costs of
administering an enforcement system. The benefits include the
potential for an increased supply of creative works accompanied
by any subsequent improvement in societal well-being.
Externality theory recognizes a balance between the cost of
exclusion and the benefit of the creation. In trademark terms, this
theory considers whether there is potential for improving
incentives to engage in trademarking activity. Internalizing
externalities may provide more return from which to finance
information production. On the other hand, permitting external
benefits through free access to marks for some uses may translate
into increased competition.
Public goods theory has traditionally been the economic
foundation for intellectual property.4 7 Public goods theory
recognizes that the market for the provision of information is
potentially flawed. Increasing access facilitates widespread use of
externalities to copyright law); Alina Ng, Copyright's Empire: Why the Law
Matters, I I MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 337 (2007) (using an externalities
approach to develop an institutional and technological analysis of copyright).
45 Harrison, supra note 44, at 6.
46 See Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections
Between Land and Property, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 467 (2005). Mr. Sterk
notes that:
The owner will typically charge a positive price for the resource even
though the marginal cost of distributing another unit is zero, resulting
in a deadweight loss. Avoiding this loss serves as a foundation for the
doctrinal limitations on copyright protection-durational limits, fair
use, and first sale among them.
Id.
47 Reference to public goods theory is most common in the legal literature
discussing copyright issues, but is also quite familiar to those writing in patent
law. For a list of articles using public goods theory in both areas, see Barnes,
supra note 30, at 23 n.2 (applying public goods theory to trademark law).
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information at no cost once the information has been produced.
Information is non-rivalrous; once a creator has supplied the
information, one person's use of the information does not interfere
with another person's use.48 From an economic perspective,
information that can be made available to more users at no
additional cost should be made available without charge.49
Making information available at zero cost naturally conflicts
with creators' incentives. The benefits that creators derive from
their own creative work may be insufficient to motivate them. If
so, allowing them to exclude others who do not pay a positive
price may provide the necessary incentive."o Exclusive rights
conflict with free access.
48 See Ng, supra note 44, at 354.
4 9 Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog
Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV.
211 (2001), cautioned that there are varying degrees of publicness that should be
considered in policy analysis. He summarized the economic perspective as
follows:
This view, that information is a public good whereas tangible things
are not, informs a great deal of thinking about intellectual property.
And it leads to the view that this very difference has important public
policy consequences, more or less along these lines: Congress should
keep firmly in mind three facts. (1) Information is a public good.
(2) Every additional form of intellectual property protection, every
increase in the scope or number of intellectual property rights, is a
restriction on information sharing. (3) Because the marginal cost of
such sharing is zero, the right price for that additional customer should
be zero, whereas any additional intellectual property protections imply
a non-zero price and therefore serve to prevent the socially desirable
outcome. In short, many commentators urge us to remember that
because information is a public good, Congress should keep the legal
restrictions on information-the intellectual property laws-as narrow
as possible.
Id. at 225.
5o Economists characterize the conflict between access at zero cost and
exclusive right to encourage creativity as a conflict between short-term and
long-term concerns, static and dynamic efficiency. See, e.g., Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory ofInfrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 947 (2005) (comparing static and dynamic efficiency and
concluding: "Taken together, these two perspectives-static and dynamic
efficiency-yield a complicated economic puzzle in terms of maximizing social
welfare. As a policy matter, it may be necessary to strike a balance between
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These concerns apply to copyright, patent, and trademark law,
all of which provide incentives to create and innovate and facilitate
public access to information. Trademarks contain information
about product source and characteristics. Consumers obtain
external benefits when they use the mark to search for goods.
Competitors who compare or describe their goods using
competitors' marks and social commentators who express
themselves using others' marks also gain external benefits. These
uses are non-rivalrous. Consumers, competitors, and social
commentators can all use source indicators for some referential
purposes without interfering with each other's use. Externality
theory and public goods theory coincide with a nuanced analysis of
misappropriation theory in requiring a balancing of access and
exclusive rights.
E. A BALANCING APPROACH TO
INTERNET INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
A balancing approach to Internet initial interest confusion
would consider the incentives, search costs, and competitive
effects of expanding exclusive rights." Consider the incentive
effects first. Generally, increased return on investment prompts
increased creativity. The makers of "Nutrasweet" brand
sweeteners have an additional incentive to invest in the renown of
their mark if they can license use of that mark to makers of baked
goods containing their product. But incentives to produce more
information are not likely to increase by prohibiting keyword-
prompted advertising. The only way prohibiting this activity
would generate investment is if GEICO were willing to license its
trademark to the companies currently utilizing the keyword-
opening access to reap static efficiency gains and restricting access to reap
dynamic efficiency gains.").
s' The very idea of trademarks is that they "lower consumer search costs and
encourage higher quality production by discouraging free-riders." Union Nat'l
Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d
839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985); Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("To protect trade-marks . . . is to
promote competition and is sound public policy.").
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prompted advertising when a consumer searches using the GEICO
mark. GEICO is, however, unlikely to license its competitor,
Allstate, to use the GEICO gecko for Allstate advertisements.
Trademark owners are unlikely to license their marks to
competitors for any purpose, so there will be no new revenue from
that source. Trademark owners might prevent consumers from
being diverted to products they would prefer more, and sell more
of their products simply because consumers do not know about
more or equally desirable alternatives, but that hardly seems like a
revenue stream worth protecting.
By contrast, keyword advertising is likely to decrease search
costs. A consumer shopping for auto insurance will benefit from
entering GEICO as a search term and being informed of Allstate's
competitive rates. Costs of finding a particular supplier such as
GEICO may be raised slightly because of the clutter of sponsored
ads on the search engine's search results page or the need to click
out of a sponsored link improperly chosen. Keyword advertising,
however, reduces the cost of finding alternative sources of goods
and services that might have a better mix of characteristics and
prices, and thus leads to increased competition. On balance,
keyword advertising appears to aid consumers.
Keyword advertising is also likely to increase competition.
Knowing that consumers are likely to compare Allstate and
GEICO rates due to keyword advertising, GEICO has an incentive
to compete more fiercely for those consumers. To do this, GEICO
may lower its prices or provide additional services. Protecting
goodwill protects competition if it increases the production of
information about product source and characteristics.5 2 But in the
area of Internet initial interest confusion, competition is unlikely to
be increased by expanding exclusive rights. Any increase in
52 Barnes & Laky, supra note 31, stated:
Protecting goodwill also promotes competition. A new entrant to a
market can use their own distinctive marks to establish brand
recognition as well as a reputation for providing goods with reliable
qualities and characteristics. By informing consumers about alternatives,
new entrants use marks and establish goodwill to compete against
existing suppliers to satisfy consumer demands.
Id. at 838.
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revenues to the trademark owner in this circumstance results
directly from reduced competition. Competition is more likely to
be increased by reducing search costs and increasing the
availability of competitive alternatives. These can both be
accomplished by allowing competitors to use others' trademarks to
create sponsored links or Internet advertising when the only result
is readily dispelled initial interest confusion. A nuanced
interpretation of the misappropriation doctrine supports this result.
CONCLUSION
The nuanced version of the Supreme Court's misappropriation
doctrine better furthers the goals of intellectual property generally
and trademark law in particular. This interpretation of
misappropriation theory balances incentive creation with free
access and leads to trademark law tailored to encourage both
trademarking activity and competition. The nuanced approach to
the misappropriation doctrine and both traditional and evolving
theoretical approaches to intellectual property law suggest that
Internet keyword advertising, on balance, reduces search costs and
improves competition without interfering with incentives to engage
in trademarking activity.
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